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Abstract 
The main purpose of this essay is to review Peter Jarvis' book on Ethics and 
education for adults in a late modern society published by the National Institute of 
Adult and Continuing Education (England and Wales) (NIACE) in 1997.  The essay 
begins by discussing the aims of the book and comparing it with the only other 
published book on ethics and adult education.  It then outlines the existentialist 
approach adopted by Jarvis before moving on to discuss the strengths and 
limitations of this approach and of the book in general.  The essay endorses the 
central thesis of the book which is that the heart of ethical action lies in relationships, 
in being concerned for the Other and in caring for the Other as a whole person. 
However the essay then goes on to argue that the book is too preoccupied with 
personal and professional issues to pay sufficient attention to many of the urgent 
ethical issues, both global and local, that are facing us to-day.  
 
Introduction 
Last year the National Institute of Adult and Continuing Education (England and 
Wales) (NIACE) published a book on Ethics and education for adults in a late 
modern society .  The author is Peter Jarvis, Professor of Continuing Education at 
the University of Surrey in England and Adjunct Professor of Adult Education at the 
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University of Georgia in the USA. He is also one of the most prolific writers in the 
field of adult education with at least five books and any number of articles and edited 
books to his name. 
 
The main purpose of this essay is to review this book. It begins by discussing the 
aims of the book and comparing it with the only other published book on ethics and 
adult education.  It then briefly outlines the existentialist approach to ethics adopted 
by Jarvis before moving on to discuss the strengths and limitations of this approach 
and of the book in general.  The essay then concludes by considering some of the 
questions and issues arising out of the review.  
Purposes and comparisons 
Although Peter Jarvis does not make explicit his aims in writing this book, they 
become apparent through an analysis of his argument.  In the Introduction he claims 
that the social values associated with modernity and the Enlightenment are being 
widely challenged in society and that education for adults is becoming '… more 
instrumental and a market commodity' (p. 1).  Within this context he advocates a 
philosophical position which seeks to recognise difference - the existence of a wide 
diversity of social and cultural values and moral principles, while at the same time 
arguing for the recognition of one universal moral value or principle – a principle 
embodied in human relationships and a 'concern for the Other'.  His purpose in 
writing this book, it would seem, is to encourage those engaged in the education of 
adults to reflect on their ethical beliefs and practices in the hope that they will be 
persuaded to accept an existentialist position. 
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In developing his argument the writer makes very little use of the mainstream 
literature on adult learning and education. He points out, however, that he is writing 
the book, not as a professional philosopher, but rather as an educationalist who 
nevertheless makes use of philosophical knowledge.   He therefore draws 
extensively on the writings of a wide range of philosophers, sociologists and others.  
The book therefore may be viewed as an interpretative work which seeks to inform 
educators of some of the thinking contained in this wider body of literature and to 
examine some of its implications for various aspects of educational practice. In 
addition to scene-setting chapters on 'Education and educational knowledge', 'The 
nature of ethics', and 'An existentialist position', chapters are devoted to the following 
topics: 'Learning to be a moral agent', 'Power and personhood in teaching'; 
'Mentoring'; 'Self-directed and contract learning'; 'Distance education'; 'Learning and 
the market place of knowledge'; 'Assessing students’ work and evaluating curricula'; 
'The education of adults as a social movement'; and 'The learning society and the 
education of desire'.  Several chapters have been published previously. However 
much of the work is new. 
 
In relation to purpose and content, as well as in many other ways, Peter Jarvis' work 
contrasts sharply with the only other book on ethics and adult education of which I 
am aware.  This latter book, edited by Ralph Brockett and published ten years ago 
by Teachers College Press, Columbia University in New York under the title, Ethical 
issues in adult education, consists of thirteen essays mostly by North American 
academics.  It may be seen as playing a part in the project to promote the 
professionalisation of adult education in North America. Its intended audience 
consisted of adult education practitioners, graduate students and professors of adult 
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education.  Chapters address such topics as the following: 'Facilitating ethical 
development'; 'Ethical issues in programme planning'; 'Marketing for adult education 
– some ethical issues'; 'Dilemmas in continuing education administration'; 'Ethical 
dilemmas in evaluating adult education programmes'; 'Ethical dilemmas in teaching 
adults'; 'Educational advising and brokering – the ethics of choice'; 'Ethics in adult 
education research'; and 'Translating personal values and philosophy into practical 
action'.  
 
Aside from chapters by Phyllis Cunningham (on 'The adult educator and social 
responsibility') and Robert Carlson (on 'A code of ethics for adult educators?') which 
adopt a critical perspective on the professionalisation of adult education, the book as 
a whole has a pragmatic flavour. For the most part it appears to assume that ethical 
issues and dilemmas can and ought to be resolved by adult educators acting in their 
capacities as educators and that these issues and dilemmas are a necessary aspect 
of the practice of adult education.  What is therefore needed if adult education is to 
be professionalised is to ensure that practitioners are encouraged to reflect on 
common practice-related dilemmas in the course of their initial and continuing 
education and training.  In line with the professionalising project the book seems to 
be promoting a professional discourse on ethics grounded in instrumental rationality.  
Unlike Jarvis, most of the authors in this book draw mainly on the education and 
training literature, with few references to the wider body of philosophical and 
sociological writings dealing with ethics.  In this respect it is more limited and lacks 
somewhat in depth in comparison with the more recent book.  On the other hand 
Ralph Brockett's book provides a very much wider range of practical ideas and 
examples of issues and dilemmas to be used in stimulating greater awareness and 
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more informed decision-making on ethical issues confronting practitioners, and 
especially those working in or for educational institutions or large organisations. 
 
Peter Jarvis is very much more ambivalent about any such professionalising project 
than Ralph Brockett and most of his co-authors. His central message may be 
interpreted as a cautionary tale.  It sounds a note of warning against the dangers of 
putting one’s faith in the kinds of modernism that underlie most forms of 
professionalisation, including in particular attempts to apply instrumental rationality to 
the task of solving ethical problems.  On the other hand at times the book tends to 
engage in the very same professionalising project that it implicitly or explicitly rejects.  
Thus for example, the definition of education is an institutionalized one.  In addition, 
despite its central commitment to personal relationships - presumably incorporating a 
view of relationships between educators and learners as equals - it seems at times 
to set educators apart form students or learners without embodying any of the 
egalitarianism underlying the notion of 'Sometimes teacher/Sometimes learner' 
(Somerville, 1980). 
 
An existentialist approach to ethical issues in the education of adults 
As mentioned above, Peter Jarvis advocates an existentialist approach to ethical 
issues. He builds his argument by outlining and then rejecting a number of 
approaches or philosophical positions referred to in the literature. Thus he rejects 
‘deontological theories’ which suggest that moral action should be based on ‘the 
fulfilment of duty’ or on ‘obedience to a set of rules such as the … Ten 
Commandments’ (p. 19), as well as utilitarian theories which argue that moral 
judgements should be based on the rational analysis of consequences/outcomes or 
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likely consequences/outcomes of actions. In addition, he rejects those philosophies 
which are based on the belief that people know intuitively what is right and wrong, as 
well as those which suggest that ethical judgements are grounded in feelings and 
emotions and that the nature of human language itself does not permit us to make 
objective and rational ethical judgements.  On the other hand, he also rejects 
Habermas' (1990; 1993) 'discourse ethics' and the notion that a universal rational 
consensus on moral and ethical judgements is possible through a process of 
communicative action in situations where rational dialogue is freed from distortions 
created by unequal relations of power. 
 
What, then, does existentialism offer that is missing from the other approaches?  
What principles underpin the approach to ethical issues discussed in this book?  In 
articulating his philosophy Peter Jarvis draws on such people as Martin Buber (1961; 
1970), the Jewish existentialist theologian, philosopher and adult educator, Zygmunt 
Bauman (1992; 1993), the Polish emigrant who became Professor of Sociology at 
the University of Leeds, and Emmanuel Levinas (Hand, 1989), the Russian Jewish 
emigrant who became Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne in Paris. 
 
The central thesis of the existentialist philosophy as propounded in this book is that 
there is one, and only one, universal good or universal moral principle to guide all 
human actions. The heart of this principle lies in the existence of human 
relationships - in ‘being concerned for the Other’ (p. 15) or in ‘caring for the Other’ as 
a whole human being (p. 47).  Both the social and the moral self grow out of and 
depend on personal relationships.  Without relationships it is impossible to be fully 
human.  To be a free person, it is necessary for the self to learn to care for the Other. 
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We learn to be moral agents. However this learning is pre-conscious: it is not 
primarily a cognitive endeavour. It is learned by the small child through the 
experience of being cared for.  It does not depend on language and hence may be 
described as pre-knowledge.  Although the universal moral good can be defended 
intellectually, it is not primarily cognitive and assuredly is not grounded in 
instrumental or technical rationality.  It therefore cannot be codified or legislated for.  
By way of contrast with neo-liberal philosophies which privilege the rational, 
independent individualistic self; existentialism - with its focus on relationships, and in 
particular I-Thou or holistic relationships rather than I-it or instrumental relationships - 
privileges the social self. 
 
There are other moral goods or values in society and many of these are highly 
significant.  They include such things as the right to individual freedom and the 
promotion of ‘a more democratic society’ (p. 44), and they may be developed by 
means of education and training.  However these moral goods or social and cultural 
values are not universal, except to the extent that they may contribute to the 
universal good of caring for the Other. In addition, there are, of course, non-moral 
goods which may also have social and cultural value. They include such things as 
efficiency, reliability, accountability, and the capacity to solve problems.  However all 
such non-moral goods are relative to particular social conditions or cultural traditions 
and can only be judged ethically in the light of their contributions to the universal 
good.  
 
Learning, the writer points out, is a natural process: it is amoral.  It is also a social 
process and requires the presence of the Other.  ‘No human body born into a social 
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environment can avoid learning – it is the basic driving force through which the 
human essence emerges from the human existent. It is fundamental to Being itself 
and while there is Being … there is the potential for learning’ (p. 65).  Education and 
training, on the other hand, are social institutions and embody and transmit social 
and cultural values. They may thus be understood to be advancing or promoting 
limited and relative social and cultural values. However education and training 
themselves do not necessarily embody or communicate universal moral value.  
‘Significantly, more knowledge does not make a better person … (and) … There is 
no logical connection between learning per se and behaving in a morally accepted 
manner’ (p. 73).  Indeed, in pointing to the potential violence and coercion in the 
relationship between teachers and students and to the dangers of teachers 
exercising arbitrary power, Jarvis draws on Bourdieu and Passeron who argue that 
all ‘pedagogic action is … objectively, symbolic violence insofar as it is the imposition 
of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power’ (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977, p 78).  
 
In spite of the dangers of symbolic and other forms of violence inherent in education 
and training, the writer argues that the processes of teaching, training, mentoring 
and assessment need not violate the autonomy or authenticity of persons.  Indeed 
universal moral values may be found in education and training as well as in other 
situations whenever person-oriented relationships predominate. To accomplish this, 
however, educators need to go beyond pre-defined role-relationships based on 
differentials in knowledge, skill and power. Teaching, mentoring, and the assessment 
of students’ work, for example, in this view, is ‘… about being with others in the 
learning situation and being available to them’ (p. 87) and about inter-subjectivity and 
empathy (p. 153). Within this context the writer discusses the growth of distance 
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education. It is argued that a number of features of late modern and postmodern 
societies including the re-alignment of space-time and the increasing dominance of 
the market as well as changes in the mode of educational production underlie the 
expansion of distance education. However these same features, which serve to 
distance teachers from learners and diminish the possibilities of providing personal 
support, make it increasingly difficult to develop person-oriented relationships. 
 
The writer argues that the task of respecting the autonomy and authenticity of 
persons and of constructing person-oriented relationships within education and 
training is becoming increasingly difficult in late modern society.  He notes that there 
are ‘two types of education – one oriented toward being and the other toward 
having’(p. 139), with increasing pressures on educators and students to give priority 
to the latter. This process involves the increasing commodification of knowledge.  
Education and qualifications are increasingly seen as market commodities, with a 
consequent narrowing of the curriculum and limited value being placed on those 
educational goals that focus on ‘learning to be’ and ‘learning to be with others’ (p. 
141).  
 
As noted earlier, the writer sounds a note of pessimism about the limits of rationality 
and about the contribution of education to the production of a moral or just society.  
He quotes Zygmunt Bauman (1993, p. 247) who argues that: ‘Morality is not safe in 
the hands of reason … Reason cannot help the moral self without depriving the self 
of what makes the self moral: that unfounded, non-rational, unarguable, no-excuses-
given and non-calculable urge to stretch towards the other …’  Jarvis argues that, 
'Morality … lies beyond the sphere of reason. It is about desire and paradoxically, we 
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are faced with an almost unresolvable problem – the education of desire – since 
desire .. lies beyond the realm of education’ (p. 165).  Those such as Ranson (1994) 
and Longworth & Davies (1996) who place their faith in the capacity of a learning 
society to deliver a new utopia, or in the capacity of education or adult education to 
produce a new moral and political order are bound to be disappointed.  The writer 
notes that ‘the learning society is not necessarily a civilised society’ (p. 169), since 
learning itself is non-moral and can be undertaken for a multitude of purposes.  
Moreover it ‘… is not the cultural values of moral education that are required for a 
better world but …(rather) … the education, or cultivation(?) of (the) desire to 
produce a better world – a desire to practise the universal value’ (p. 170). 
 
Strengths and limitations 
This book sets out to fill a gap in the literature of adult education.  For some years I 
have been conscious of the need for a study which would examine in some depth 
the ethical underpinnings of adult learning and education and would thus 
complement the work done by Ralph Brockett and his colleagues. Moreover, in 
recent years, with the increasing divisions both globally and locally between rich and 
poor and massive and widespread social dislocation and fragmentation, as well as 
the increasing instrumentalism driving most forms of education for adults, it seems to 
me that the need for such a study has grown in urgency. For these reasons I 
welcome this book. 
 
The central message of the book is, I believe, an immensely important one, and I 
find myself in agreement with much of Peter Jarvis’ philosophy.  This is perhaps not 
surprising, since it seems that we have both been influenced by many of the same 
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philosophers, including in particular Martin Buber, whose work I first came across in 
the early-1960s.  It may be of interest to note that in the New Zealand context 
probably the best-known protagonist of Buber’s existentialism has been Lloyd 
Geering (1983).  
 
In spite of these and other positive features, however, overall I found it a 
disappointing book. Sadly I think that it is unnecessarily difficult to read. There is a 
sense of breathless incomprehensibility about some sections, with sentences moving 
from one idea to the next in a series of qualifying phrases and clauses. For example 
a section which discusses 'practical knowledge' contains the following sentence: 'In 
everyday life people do not think about how they are going to behave, for a great 
deal of behaviour in social life has been habitualised, and then consciously decide 
which bit of philosophy and which bit of psychology, or ethics, etc, they are going to 
use in that situation, even though analysis of their actions might suggest that is what 
they do' (p. 10).   
 
Adding to the difficulty is the book’s lack of effective organisation.  In several cases 
arguments and ideas are introduced and then dropped, only to be picked up and 
developed again in a later chapter. Moreover, throughout the book there are a large 
number of typographical errors, and there is considerable repetition. The most 
striking example of the latter that I noticed occurs in the discussion on postmodern 
theories of knowledge when a whole paragraph is repeated verbatim (pp. 72 & 122-
3).  All this points to a lack of integration which could so easily have been corrected 
by means of a thorough editing job.  Had this been done I suspect that a much 
shorter and more readable book would have emerged. 
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Secondly, it seems to me that the discussion of a number of key concepts and ideas 
is somewhat limited. Concepts like ideology remain undefined, and I found the 
discussions of such concepts as freedom (p. 99), hegemony (p. 29), individualism 
(pp. 69-70 & 97-102) and power (pp. 29-30 & 77-87) highly unsatisfactory.  Moreover 
there is no significant discussion of the ethical issues arising out of the ways in which 
class, gender and race have historically shaped our economic, political, social, 
cultural and educational policies and practices, both globally and locally. 
 
Thirdly, many of the arguments and themes developed in the book lack depth and 
coherence. Thus for example the introductory discussion of the nature of education 
and educational knowledge, I found, to be quite limited in a number of respects, of 
which only two will be mentioned here. Firstly, the writer's argument or assertion that: 
'… there can be no education without some form of institutional provision .. ' (p. 7) 
seems to be very difficult to sustain in the light of considerable evidence of the 
importance of popular and community-based education and of the role of 
independent study in the lives of many people over the centuries.  Secondly, the 
distinction which the writer draws between the concept of education which he argues 
is neutral and the practice of education which is not neutral (p. 7) is a highly 
problematic one. As the writer notes, Freire (1973a; 1973b; 1973c) is one of many 
educators to have argued that education cannot be neutral, and a similar stance is 
taken by Lawson (1979; 1982) and other liberal philosophers who claim that 
education is a normative and evaluative concept and by post-structuralists who 
would argue that the concept of education cannot be understood without locating it 
within a specific discourse.  It is difficult to understand why the writer finds it 
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necessary to define education in these ways since it does not seem to advance the 
main argument of the book. 
 
Further examples of arguments and ideas that need development include those 
concerning distance education (pp. 111-120) and learning and the market place of 
knowledge (pp. 121-133).  The writer’s discussion of distance education fails to take 
into account a number of important contemporary debates.  For example, on the one 
hand, some would argue, seemingly in support of the writer, that since distance 
education is an ‘expert system’ and hence in many ways embodies ‘universal 
strangerhood’ (pp. 118-119), it is necessarily and inherently impersonal.  In such 
distance education institutions therefore, in this view, it is necessarily very difficult if 
not impossible to foster I-Thou interpersonal relationships.  On the other hand, 
others argue that the new digital technologies are beginning to make it possible to 
develop new ‘convivial’ forms of distance education which provide for new forms of 
dialogue and community, and for the promotion and support of interpersonal 
relationships, freed to an ever increasing extent from the constraints of space and 
time.   
 
If the new technologies are to promote the kinds of relationships advocated in this 
book – or, more modestly, if they are not to act as barriers to the formation and 
maintenance of such relationships - it may be argued that it will, however, be 
necessary to remove control of distance education from the constraints imposed by 
the global market place and instead seek to locate it within civil society.  This issue, 
however, is not addressed satisfactorily in this book. 
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Indeed, although relationships between the education and training of adults and the 
market economy are addressed at numerous points in the book, it seems to me that 
this discussion remains somewhat limited. At several points attention is drawn to the 
conflict between the requirements of the market economy and those of a society that 
gives priority to caring for the Other as a full human being, and the implications of 
this for the education and training of adults are discussed (pp. 39-41 & 121-133).  In 
my view, however, this discussion is not taken far enough.  The writer appears to 
take for granted the current form of the market economy under capitalism.  He 
appears to be unaware of the political dimensions of the capitalist market economy 
and of the ways in which the market economy is shaped by the interests of specific 
groups in society and in particular by the demands of multi-national capital.   
 
A consequence of this is that the writer also appears to be unaware of the political 
dimensions of education and training. This apparent lack of awareness of underlying 
structural forces and of the political struggles affecting developments in the political 
economy and education is reflected in the discussion of social justice (pp. 44-46) 
which takes as a primary focus the notion that we cannot achieve a better world 
through regulation.  It is also reflected in the discussion of the education of adults 
and social movements (pp. 164-5) and the very limited discussion of radical 
traditions in the education of adults. It is worth noting that on page 102 of the book 
we are promised a later chapter on radical education. This however never 
materialises! 
 
Conclusion 
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What then can one say by way of conclusion?  As indicated earlier, the book does 
contain some very important ideas.  I believe that the notion that at the heart of 
ethical action lies concern for the Other and the development of I-Thou rather than I-
It relationships, is of fundamental importance.  Acceptance of this idea has major 
implications for the ways in which educators might act both as educators and as 
human beings.  This book, and in particular perhaps the final chapter on the learning 
society and the education of desire, does a good job of examining some of these 
implications.  
 
Despite this it seems to me that the book fails in two or three key respects.  Firstly 
the varied quality of the writing is a major shortcoming which may well prevent many 
potential readers from coming to grips with the book’s content.  Secondly, the book 
largely fails to make the links between personal and social philosophies, between the 
ethics of interpersonal relations  and the ethics of social policy and political action.  In 
my view the book is too preoccupied with the professional and interpersonal 
dimensions of ethical action to pay sufficient attention to its political dimension.  
 
In spite of his critique of individualism, ultimately it seems that the writer finds himself 
endorsing a form of individualism that is not incompatible with a neo-liberal position. 
This arises ultimately, I believe, out of the failure to bring together the insights and 
understandings of existentialism with those which may be drawn from various radical 
traditions.  This gives rise in turn to the further failure to address satisfactorily some 
of the big ethical issues of our times.  These include such issues as the growth of 
poverty, increasing inequalities, widespread social dislocation and fragmentation and 
increasing alienation referred to earlier in this essay, as well as questions about the 
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sustainability of life on this planet.  I believe that these large questions give rise to 
some of the most important and urgent ethical issues facing all of us involved in adult 
learning and education as educators, as citizens and as human beings.  A book on 
ethics for adult educators that fails to address these and other big issues has, in my 
view, done only half its job. 
 
These then are some of my reservations. In spite of this, however, I found the book 
sufficiently stimulating and provocative to send me off to the library to pursue my 
own further reading in the field.  Should other readers be similarly provoked or 
stimulated this in itself may well be one of the most important tributes that the writer 
of a book may receive. 
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